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that were similar to their own than when participants perceived targets as having personalities different from their own. More recently, studies have shown that people are considerably better at decoding mental states from the faces of in-group targets than from the faces of out-group targets (Adams et al., 2010; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002) and that perceivers regularly deny that out-group members have the same kinds of rich mental experiences they unhesitatingly claim for themselves and their fellow in-group members (Leyens et al., 2000) . Together, this evidence suggests not only that self-other similarities enhance perspective taking, but also that self-other differences might hinder perspective taking.
Despite strong evidence that similarity increases the likelihood that perceivers will actively contemplate others' perspectives in the first place, focusing exclusively on self-other similarities might undermine the ability to distinguish one's own perspective from the perspectives of others-a central component of successful perspective taking (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Higgins, 1981; Mitchell, 2009; Tamir & Mitchell, 2010) . Indeed, several theoretical accounts maintain that mentalizing involves an initial focus on self-other similarity followed by some adjustment for potential differences (Epley et al., 2004; Nickerson, 1999 ; see also Gentner & Markman, 1994) , suggesting that once the perspective-taking process commences, factors that draw perceivers' attention to self-other differences might actually lead perceivers farther down the road to intuiting other minds. Thus, focusing on self-other differences might allow perceivers to look beyond the limits of their own perspectives.
Accordingly, we propose that a difference mind-set, a cognitive orientation wherein distinctive self-referential information is activated and used as a comparison standard to draw inferences about other people (Mussweiler, 2003a (Mussweiler, , 2003b , could provide an efficacious route to intuiting other people's minds. Just as a difference mind-set reduces the tendency to overascribe attributes that characterize a social group to individual group members (Corcoran, Hundhammer, & Mussweiler, 2009 ), so too might it limit perceivers' tendency to overimpute their own perspectives to others. This line of reasoning adopts a view of perspective taking as a comparative process that is guided by assessments of self-other similarity and difference. According to this account, a similarity mind-set should lead perceivers to assimilate others' perspectives to perceivers' own perspectives (i.e., egocentrism), whereas a difference mind-set should lead perceivers to contrast others' perspectives away from (or more weakly assimilate others' perspectives to) perceivers' own perspectives (Mussweiler, 2003a (Mussweiler, , 2003b . In the research reported here, we sought to provide the first empirical demonstration that a difference mind-set can limit egocentrism and thus facilitate perspective taking.
One implication of this account is that mental-state reasoning might benefit from circumstances that naturally afford a difference mind-set. Intergroup encounters provide one such context. Indeed, social category membership is one of the primary tools used to highlight the ways in which people differ.
Furthermore, research indicates that exposure to out-group targets elicits a difference mind-set ), a notion that finds further support in research indicating that people typically perceive out-group members in ways that accentuate their differences from the in-group (including the self; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963 ; see also Krueger, 1992) . This work suggests that the likelihood of distinguishing one's own perspective from that of another person-a crucial ingredient for successful perspective taking-should be higher when one mentalizes about a person who is perceived to be different from oneself than when one mentalizes about a person who is perceived to be similar to oneself. Consistent with this supposition, studies have shown that when perceivers try to predict other people's attitudes and preferences, perceivers are less apt to assume that out-group targets share their own predilections than to assume that in-group targets do so (Ames, 2004; Robbins & Krueger, 2005) . What remains unclear, however, is whether perspective taking is actually facilitated when participants contemplate the minds of outgroup targets, relative to when they contemplate the minds of in-group targets. Experiments 4 and 5 investigated this counterintuitive possibility.
The Current Research
Five experiments tested the hypothesis that a difference mindset facilitates perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. The first set of experiments employed a priming procedure to assess whether participants directly primed with a difference mind-set are more likely to spontaneously adopt other people's visual perspectives (Experiment 1) and less likely to overimpute their own conceptual perspectives to others (Experiments 2 and 3) than are participants primed with a similarity mind-set or control participants. The second set of experiments assessed whether intergroup contexts facilitate perspective taking more than do intragroup contexts. In Experiment 4, participants reasoned about the beliefs of a protagonist whose ethnicity was either the same as or different from their own. Experiment 5 employed a minimal-group paradigm and tested whether performance on an interpersonal coordination task was facilitated when participants worked with an outgroup partner, relative to when they worked with an in-group partner.
Experiment 1: Perceptual Perspective Taking
Experiment 1 examined the effects of a difference mind-set on the tendency to spontaneously adopt other people's visual perspectives, a developmental precursor to the conceptual perspective taking required for higher-level mental-state reasoning (Selman, 1971) . Participants completed a spatial perspective-taking task during which they identified the spatial location of a target object that could be described either from their own or from another person's visual perspective (Tversky & Hard, 2009 ). We predicted that participants primed with a difference mind-set would be less influenced by their own perceptual vantage point, and thus more likely to spontaneously adopt an other-oriented visual perspective, than would participants primed with a similarity mind-set or participants in a control condition.
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-two German undergraduates (52% female, 48% male) were randomly assigned to a similarity-mind-set, difference-mind-set, or control condition.
Procedure and materials. Participants in the two priming conditions first completed a picture-comparison task in which they consecutively compared four pairs of illustrated pictures by listing either three similarities or three differences for each pair (Mussweiler, 2001) . Previous research has demonstrated that this procedural priming task activates a similarity or difference mind-set (depending on whether the focus is on similarities or differences) that carries over to subsequent experimental tasks (e.g., Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008) . Control participants instead viewed one of the pictures from each pair and simply listed three attributes describing it.
Next, participants completed a spatial perspective-taking task (Tversky & Hard, 2009 We scored location descriptions from the participant's own viewpoint ("right side") as self-oriented and descriptions from the viewpoint of the person in the photo ("left side") as otheroriented. Only 1 participant's response ("at the top") fit into neither category; his data were excluded.
Results and discussion
As shown in Table 1 , participants primed with a difference mind-set were more likely to provide other-oriented responses than were either participants primed with a similarity mind-set, t(78) = 2.60, p = .01, d = 0.59, or control participants, t(78) = 2.10, p = .04, d = 0.48, who did not differ (t < 1). Overall, the effect of condition was significant in a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), F(2, 78) = 3.80, p = .03, η p 2 = .09. These findings provide initial support for our hypothesis that a difference mind-set can facilitate perspective taking. Compared with participants primed with a similarity mind-set and participants in the control condition, those primed with a difference mind-set were more likely to spontaneously adopt an other-oriented visual perspective. That similarity-primed participants did not differ from control participants supports the notion that a similarity mind-set is the default mind-set enacted during social inference (Mussweiler, 2003a) . The next two experiments investigated whether a difference mind-set enhances the conceptual perspective taking required for higher-level mental-state reasoning.
Experiment 2: Deciphering Communication Intentions
Communication is often ambiguous, and successful communication entails recognizing that a communication partner's knowledge might differ from one's own. However, evidence indicates that people who have privileged information about speakers' intentions are "cursed" by this knowledge, overestimating the transparency of speakers' utterances and inaccurately predicting that others see the world as they do (Keysar, 1994) . Experiment 2 examined whether priming a difference mind-set can attenuate this egocentric bias. Participants predicted how a naive recipient would interpret an ambiguous e-mail message. Although it was clear to participants that the message was intended to be sarcastic, this privileged information was not available to the message recipient. We anticipated that participants primed with a difference mind-set would be less influenced by their own privileged knowledge, and thus more likely to acknowledge the message recipient's naive perspective, than would participants primed with a similarity mind-set and control participants.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred German undergraduates (81% female, 19% male) were randomly assigned to a similarity-mind-set, difference-mind-set, or control condition. Procedure and materials. First, participants in the two priming conditions completed the picture-comparison task from Experiment 1, listing either three similarities or three differences for each of four consecutive picture pairs. Control participants did not complete the mind-set-priming task. Next, participants completed a message-interpretation task (Keysar, 1994) . They read a scenario describing an exchange between Michael and Claudia. On Claudia's recommendation, Michael took his parents to a restaurant, where they had an unpleasant dining experience. The next day, Michael sent an e-mail to Claudia, stating only, "About the restaurant, it was marvelous, just marvelous." Thus, nothing in the e-mail suggested insincerity, nor was Claudia aware of the family's poor dining experience. After reading the scenario, participants answered the following question: "How do you think Claudia interpreted Michael's e-mail message?" (1 = very sarcastic, 7 = very sincere).
Results and discussion
As shown in Table 1 , participants primed with a difference mind-set predicted that Claudia would perceive greater sincerity in Michael's e-mail than did either participants primed with a similarity mind-set, t(97) = 3.30, p = .001, d = 0.67, or control participants, t(97) = 2.15, p = .03, d = 0.44, who did not differ (t < 1.12, p > .26). Overall, the effect of condition was significant, F(2, 97) = 5.55, p < .01, η p 2 = .10. These results provide additional support for our contention that a difference mind-set facilitates recognition of other people's differing perspectives.
Experiment 3: Reasoning About False Beliefs
The goal of Experiment 3 was to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 2 using a different form of conceptual perspective taking: false-belief reasoning. Participants viewed a scenario and inferred a protagonist's belief about the location of an object. Some participants received privileged information regarding the object's true location, whereas others did not. Evidence indicates that both children (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ) and adults (Birch & Bloom, 2007) have difficulty disregarding their own privileged knowledge when inferring the protagonist's more naive perspective. We predicted that participants primed with a difference mind-set would be less influenced by their own privileged knowledge, and thus more likely to acknowledge the protagonist's false belief, than would participants primed with a similarity mind-set.
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-one German undergraduates (57% female, 43% male) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (mind-set: similarity, difference) × 2 (location knowledge: informed, ambiguous) between-subjects design.
Procedure and materials. Participants first completed the picture-comparison task used previously, focusing on either similarities or differences. Next, participants completed a false-belief task (Birch & Bloom, 2007) . They saw two picture panels depicting a scenario involving two characters. The first panel showed Vicki, who was holding a violin and standing near four different-colored containers: blue, purple, red, and green. Participants read, "This is Vicki. She finishes playing her violin and puts it in the blue container. Then she goes outside to play." The second panel showed the same four containers in a rearranged configuration. Participants read, "While Vicki is outside playing, her sister, Denise, moves the violin to. . . ." Participants in the informed condition then learned that Denise moved the violin to the red container, whereas participants in the ambiguous condition learned that Denise moved the violin to "another" (i.e., unspecified) container. All participants next read, "Then, [Denise] rearranges the containers in the room. . . . When Vicki returns, she wants to play her violin. What are the chances Vicki will first look for her violin in each of the above containers?" Participants wrote their answers in percentages, one beneath each container.
Results and discussion
Analyses focused on the probabilities assigned to the red and blue containers. As depicted in Figure 1 , participants primed with a difference mind-set assigned lower probabilities to the red container, t(39) = 3.05, p < .01, d = 0.98, and higher probabilities to the blue container, t(38) = 2.27, p = .03, d = 0.74, than did participants primed with a similarity mind-set, but only when they knew the violin's true location, as confirmed by a Mind-Set × Container interaction, F(1, 39) = 7.28, p = .01, η p 2 = .16. When participants were unaware of the violin's precise location, mind-set had no effect on estimates for the red and blue containers (simple effects: ts < 1; two-way interaction: F < 1). The overall pattern of means produced a significant Mind-Set × Location Knowledge × Container interaction, F(1, 77) = 4.36, p = .04, η p 2 = .05. These findings indicate that a difference mind-set affected false-belief reasoning. Participants who were primed with a difference mind-set were less cursed by their own privileged knowledge and better able to acknowledge the protagonist's naive perspective than were participants who were primed with a similarity mind-set. Taken together, Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrate that directly priming a difference mindset can enhance both conceptual and perceptual forms of perspective taking.
Experiment 4: Intergroup False-Belief Reasoning
Thus far, we have shown that directly priming a difference mind-set increases the ability to shift perspectives, so that one can appreciate other people's visual perspectives and lack of privileged knowledge. But what situations naturally afford a 138 Todd et al. difference mind-set? As noted earlier, intergroup relations are consistently marked by a focus on differences ). Given the relationship between a difference mind-set and perspective taking established in the first three experiments, in Experiment 4 we investigated the possibility that perceivers are less susceptible to curse-of-knowledge biases when mentalizing about out-group members than when mentalizing about in-group members. We predicted that participants would more readily attribute a false belief to an outgroup protagonist than to an in-group protagonist.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred sixteen German undergraduates (52% female, 48% male) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (protagonist: German, Turkish) × 2 (location knowledge: informed, ambiguous) between-subjects design.
Procedure and materials. Participants completed a falsebelief task that was identical to the one used in Experiment 3, except that the ethnicity of the characters in the scenario was varied. In the in-group condition, participants read about "Julia" and "Tanja" (common German names). In the outgroup condition, participants read about "Yesim" and "Büsra" (common Turkish names), and we modified Yesim's features (i.e., darker skin and hair) to ensure that participants encoded her as an ethnic out-group member.
Results and discussion
Analyses again focused on the probabilities assigned to the red and blue containers. Among participants who knew the violin's actual location, probability estimates were lower for the red container, t(52.97) = 2.59, p = .01, d = 0.71, and were higher for the blue container, t(56) = 2.20, p = .03, d = 0.59, when the protagonist was an out-group member than when the protagonist was an in-group member, resulting in a significant Protagonist × Container interaction, F(1, 56) = 5.92, p = .02, η p 2 = .10. When participants were unaware of the violin's actual location, the protagonist's ethnicity did not affect their estimates for the red and blue containers (simple effects: ts < 1; Protagonist × Container interaction: F < 1). The overall pattern of means (see Fig. 2 ) produced a significant Protagonist × Location Knowledge × Container interaction, F(1, 112) = 4.90, p = .03, η p 2 = .04. In a conceptual replication of Experiment 3, we found that perceivers were less cursed by their own privileged knowledge when reasoning about the beliefs of an out-group protagonist than when reasoning about the beliefs of an in-group protagonist. These findings indicate that conceptual perspective taking can be facilitated in intergroup contexts.
Experiment 5: Increasing Interpersonal Coordination
In our final experiment, we sought to determine (a) whether the intergroup effect found in Experiment 4 would hold even when the basis for group membership was minimal and (b) whether working with an out-group partner facilitates perspectivetaking behavior. We created a minimal-group setting and had participants work with either an in-group or an out-group partner on an interpersonal coordination task in which the participants had differing perceptual perspectives. We predicted that out-group pairs would be more likely to recognize their partner's differing perceptual perspective, and thus would require less time to complete the coordination task, than would in-group pairs. 
Method
Participants and design. Fifty-six German undergraduates (89% female, 11% male) were randomly assigned to an ingroup or out-group condition.
Procedure and materials. Participants arrived in same-sex pairs. To create minimal groups, we first had participants estimate the number of dots in each of 10 visual displays (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974) . Participants then received computer feedback about their ostensible estimation tendencies. In the in-group condition, the participants received the same feedback (e.g., both overestimators). In the out-group condition, participants received different feedback (i.e., one overestimator, one underestimator). To make group membership salient, the experimenter asked both participants about their estimation tendency and recorded this information on a clipboard. Next, supposedly as part of a different experiment, participants sat opposite each other and took turns directing each other through two mazes (Stephenson & Wicklund, 1984) . Each maze was mounted on a poster board and required 14 moves from start to finish. Each participant served as a director on one trial and as a blindfolded follower on another trial; order was determined by a coin flip. The director's objective was to guide the blindfolded follower through the maze as quickly as possible using only four commands: left, right, forward, and backward. The blindfolded follower navigated the maze by moving a finger along the poster board according to the director's instructions. Insofar as directors adapted their instructions to the perceptual perspective of the blindfolded followers, this should have facilitated maze completion. Time to traverse the maze (separately for each trial) served as our dependent measure.
Finally, participants answered questions assessing their memory for their own and their partner's feedback on the estimation task. All participants correctly remembered this feedback. 17, an effect that did not differ across trials (F < 1). Analyses of error rates (e.g., turning left instead of right) yielded no main or interaction effects (Fs < 1), suggesting that out-group pairs did not sacrifice accuracy for speed.
Results and discussion
These findings provide further support for our hypothesis that intergroup contexts can facilitate perspective taking. Even when the basis for group membership was determined on an ad hoc and minimal basis, perceivers were less cursed by their own perceptual perspectives and were better able to adapt their instructions when they worked with an out-group partner than when they worked with an in-group partner.
General Discussion
Five experiments, using two different instantiations of a difference mind-set and four different perceptual and conceptual perspective-taking tasks, provided clear and consistent support for our hypothesis that focusing on differences increases perceivers' ability to step outside their own perspectives. Participants who were primed with a difference mind-set were more likely to spontaneously adopt other people's visual perspectives and to acknowledge that others may not share their privileged knowledge than were participants who were primed with a similarity mind-set and control participants. These results demonstrate that a difference mind-set directly facilitates perspective taking. Furthermore, we discovered that both 140
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conceptual and perceptual forms of perspective taking were enhanced in intergroup contexts, which can act as a naturally occurring instantiation of a difference mind-set ). Specifically, perceivers were less cursed by their own privileged knowledge when mentalizing about out-group members than when mentalizing about in-group members and communicated more effectively to interaction partners whose group membership differed from their own than to in-group interaction partners. As noted earlier, both common wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that there is an intimate connection between self-other similarities and perspective taking. Although the motivation to actively contemplate other people's perspectives is typically greater for similar others, successful perspective taking is often contingent upon maintaining a distinction between self and other. Accordingly, environments that afford a difference mind-set hold the potential to facilitate perspective taking and to improve performance on tasks that require awareness of multiple vantage points. For instance, demographically diverse environments have been linked to increases in integrative complexity (Antonio et al., 2004) and the communication of unshared information within work units (Phillips, Northcraft, & Neale, 2006) . Considered in conjunction with this previous work, our results imply that demographically diverse organizations might be better equipped to harness the benefits of perspective taking than are homogeneous organizations.
We do not claim that a strict focus on self-other differences always provides the most optimal approach for mentalizing or for navigating social interactions more generally. Rather, we argue that focusing on self-other differences should be most beneficial when another person's perspective does, in fact, differ from one's own (as was the case in the current experiments). Insofar as one's own perspective provides a good proxy for inferring other people's perspectives, it seems reasonable to utilize self-referential information (Hoch, 1987) . Just as failing to recognize other people's differing perspectives can pave the way for miscommunication and misunderstanding, failing to appreciate similarities where they do exist can create barriers to conflict resolution (Ross & Ward, 1995) and can hinder intergroup relations (Mallett, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008) .
It is clear that recognizing similarities increases intergroup harmony (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) but also impairs the ability to acknowledge differing vantage points. In contrast, identifying differences facilitates acknowledgment of other people's perspectives but can also exacerbate intergroup hostilities (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009) . Similarly, work on negotiations indicates that friendship creates rapport but also stifles integration of economic interests (Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995) . Expanding the pie requires that people recognize and trade off their differing priorities ("I'll concede on my low-priority issue if you concede on my high-priority issue"); simply compromising down the middle makes both parties worse off (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008) .
The current work suggests that, whereas a similarity mindset can motivate perspective-taking attempts, a difference mind-set limits egocentrism and can foster the recognition of differing perspectives. Future work should explore factors that might enable a simultaneous focus on similarities and differences. Striking a balance between a similarity focus and a difference focus may hold the key to creating more mutually beneficial social relations.
